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 Live code, live art and the BwO dissection 
H. Reeve* 
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Hester Reeve’s practice encompasses live art, philosophy, drawing, David Bohm's 
'Dialogue' and socially engaged projects. She is interested in the relationship between 
critical thinking and human agency in everyday life particularly when it is risked through 
the figure of ‘the artist’ (where what constitutes an artist is broadly conceived and not 
exclusive to art school training). Recent public works have been staged at Tanzquartier, 
Vienna, Tate Britain (working under the umbrella of The Emily Davison Lodge with 
Olivia Plender) and the Yorkshire Sculpture Park.  
 
 
Abstract:  
This extended artist statement formulates some provocations to the possibilities of live 
performance which have been prompted by my involvement in a collaborative project 
between live coders and live artists. Acknowledging that both art forms share a pre-
performance conception-operation frame work which then unfolds through live 
improvisation, I explore the differences in how each discipline summons the body 
(‘extended carnality’ in the case of live coding and ‘critical subjectivity’ in the case of live 
art) in order to provide fertile ground for each practice to challenge the presuppositions of 
the other. The formulation of my core concerns is facilitated through reference to Deleuze 
and Guattari’s BwO (body without organs).  
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Introduction 
In this extended artist statement I want to share some current thoughts about performance 
resulting from my involvement over the past few years with the live coding community. 
Initiated through synergistic conversations with Alex McLean, our project ‘Live Notation-
Extending Matters of Performance’
1
 provided various platforms for an interdisciplinary 
conversation between live art and live code to take place and has given me much scope for 
reflection. 
By way of background, as a live artist, my training is in fine art and not in 
performance studies and this distinction is important to note; although live art is often 
referred to as ‘performance art,’ I rarely call myself a ‘performer’ since it is more the case 
that I am invested in using my body-being to activate and explore ideas and expressions ‘in 
the world’ (as opposed to ‘on a stage’). In a self-professed unruly discipline, I am a wild 
cannon, so I do not claim to be the spokesperson for live art per se (and twenty five years in 
to a committed practice, I realize that I am, and always have been, more of an artist-
philosopher invested in the relationship between ideas and action-in-the-world). 
Nonetheless, performance and performativity are implicated in what I do. My live art 
actions are usually site-specific, once only events which are unrehearsed and usually 
durational – i.e. they are an unfolding live experiment. Already parallels with live coding 
are apparent.  
Interestingly, the two disciplines are not only very close in some ways, they are 
very far apart in others and it is this dynamic, from my perspective, which has made for 
such an instructive friendship. Key to the similarities are the innately experimental, time-
based and non-commodity orientated performance works that on one hand consciously link 
to a resistance against market forces determining cultural value and on the other to an 
almost dogged pursuit of the experience of creativity for creativity’s sake. Also, both types 
of performance -for all their spontaneity - rely on premeditated and highly crafted 
frameworks (be they a conceptual raison d’etre or a programmed series of algorithms). It 
could be said that both practices set up temporal ‘systems of personal freedom,’ 
conceptual-operational frameworks for improvisation, which require the author to perform 
via inhabiting the framework as opposed to communicating it.
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The crux of the difference between the two disciplines, for sake of argument, lies 
in live code performance’s ‘conception-operational drive’ laying in systems of language 
whereas that of live art lies in embodied critical subjectivity. To put it another way, if both 
practices are types of ‘spatial texts,’ a proposition that I explored as part of the Live 
Notation project, then live code is an articulation of the sign (sign = something that stands 
for something else and works in relationship to other signs in order to function) and live art 
is an articulation of the symbol (symbol = something that is not a proxy for its object but a 
vehicle for the conception of that object, something that operates between human, world 
and audience and linking to synthetic feeling). This is not to judge or insinuate that there is 
any correct inception drive for live performances or actions, I am well aware that it can be 
extremely non-productive to think issues over through supposed definitions and 
oppositions. However, this experienced (or fantasised) synergy of acute similarity and acute 
difference between the two disciplines has been extremely productive for my thinking 
about what is at stake in the practice of live art and attempting this analysis has helped me 
understand where live art can challenge its presuppositions and, by corollary, where live 
code has pause for reflection. All this because what we do and why we do it matters – 
something I will return to in my conclusion. 
 
Extended carnality 
One of the most challenging realisations that has come out of the collaboration with live 
coders for me centres around how easy it is to limit what we conceive to be the body in 
performance. You might expect that to amount to my rebutting the live coder for the 
underuse or even mis-use of the body in his or her work, which is often hunched up, 
immoveable over their laptop, usually always present but hardly ever that visually 
prominent. But in fact, witnessing the body in live code (such as in Alex McLean’s 
performances) triggered me to consider that actually, despite the explicit use of my body in 
my work, it might be I, the live artist, who might be unknowingly repressing the body 
through performance. Could live coding be a way of realizing the body in a way that I had 
not yet thought possible? Despite often being static in one place, when Alex McLean 
performs, his body is not just pivotal to the operation of the performance (he is ‘typing’ and 
activating code) but the intensity of his mind-body engagement comes across less as ‘a 
body’ and more as an ‘intensity node’ allowing the entire performance space and other 
objects in it to also come to light as intensity nodes, the fingers on the analogue keyboard 
exist on an equal footing to the chimeric movement of digital letters across the projection 
screen, for example. One is affected by a sense of distributed agency where human and 
non-human elements attain a liveness together. So this is not an extending of the body 
proper and more a case of what I came to term ‘extended carnality’ in line with current 
posthuman rejections of classical humanist divisions between self, animal, matter, 
machines, information etc.
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 The term extended carnality, as opposed to extended body, is to 
avoid representative and anthropocentric thought and instead imply a muscularity of 
materiality; no centre stage figure to the performance, just everything equally valid as a 
pulsating mise en scene. Extended carnality is extended touch and it implies that the 
touching is occurring between everything gathered together. So we can also talk about 
multi-directional performance too, as if the space and the temporal time of the work are 
performing themselves too.  
This affect definitely arises from the intentional, immersive labour of the 
performer but in this regard live art is no different. So, something else is at play in live code 
to affect this sense of an extended carnality via the work’s operations. Perhaps this is due to 
live coding’s removal of an obstacle linked to a mind-set around the body that live art has 
yet to fully grapple with - what Deleuze and Guattari, following the writings of Antonin 
Artaud, one of the most influential figures in European drama theory, allude to as 
‘obedience to God’ in their questioning after how one makes of oneself a ‘body without 
organs,’ or, as they write it, a BwO (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). 
 
Liberation via BwO 
In a radio play, To be done with the judgment of God, broadcast in 1947, Artaud claimed, 
“When you will have made him a body without organs, then you will have delivered him 
from his automatic reactions and restored him to his true freedom.” Calling for the 
attainment of the BwO is not to speak of literal or metaphorical organ removal but of 
escape from the all-pervasive reality principle that organizes and thus limits the body 
through definition as an organism (thus also limiting the ways in which the world itself can 
come into being). Deleuze and Guattari explain that this paradigm which has so restricted 
our capacities as physical-psychic-social forces has resulted in three delimiting strata, the 
organism, signification and subjectification. Avoiding the linear monotheist ideology that 
the God-paradigm has set up, and which inscribes the most radical amongst us, Deleuze 
and Guattari advise that a BwO does not have a starting or completion point, each one 
simultaneously remains ‘the egg.’ By this they do not infer a seed (which would be to 
conjure a logical progression of growth where the egg gets used up in the process) but a, 
“milieu of pure intensity, spatium not extension” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, 164). In a 
similar circular vein, whilst you have to deliberately work to construct one, a BwO does not 
have a starting point and nor can you ever complete it; is already laying await adjacent to 
you the moment you start to desire it. The clearest way to understand what the philosophers 
are getting at is in this simile: “The BwO is a childhood block, a becoming, the opposite of 
childhood memory. It is not the child “before” the adult, or the mother “before” the child: it 
is the strict contemporaneousness of the adult…The BwO is precisely this intense germen 
where there are and cannot be either parents or children (organic representation)” (164).  
Deleuze and Guattari are adamant that construction of a BwO is not a conceptual 
affair but very much linked to the body and praxis. However, it is no longer useful to think 
of your body as a discrete entity but of working your body’s mental and semantic 
possibility via experiments with matter (physical, social, psychic, biological and cosmic) in 
order to achieve ‘intensities.’ And how? In my understanding, before any steps can be 
taken, your capacity for an extended carnality has to reach a critical point of desire, an 
extreme risk of selfhood, (as it did with Artaud). The text is littered with references to the 
necessity of desire but a desire that can ultimately only fulfill itself via circulating as a 
component, and not a director, of a BwO. More concretely, Deleuze and Guattari explain 
that the three strata constructed through the organism model inevitably have to form the 
first foothold, but only the first. From here on out, the task is to found experimental 
practices that de-articulate the strata in order to seek after the “crowned anarchy of the 
multiple” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, 158). The self does not disappear but looses its 
traditional modus operandi as an organizing principle and instead becomes an appendix, a 
residium, to a BwO. They advise (60): ”Tearing the conscious away from the subject in 
order to make it a means of exploration, tearing the unconscious away from significance 
and interpretation in order to make it a veritable production: this is assuredly no more or 
less difficult than tearing the body away form the organism.” The reader is warned that the 
process is dangerous. A BwO can be botched if it is made incautiously or too expressly. 
Instead of an outward force, one gets collapse, inadvertently mining inwards and deeper in 
to the God strata and this results in an empty BwO, the return of ideology and living via the 
death drive (as in, for example, the drug addict). This process sounds violent, but then the 
‘judgment of God’ has perniciously infiltrated every aspect of our approach to existence 
and besides which Deleuze and Guattari encourage us (60), “Dismantling the organism has 
never meant killing yourself, but rather opening the body to connections that presuppose an 
entire assemblage, circuits, conjunctions, levels and thresholds, passages and distributions 
of intensity…”  
The above account of a BwO
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 stands as an intriguing lens through which to 
appreciate some of the new affordances that live coding brings to performance. For me, the 
performing body’s intensity during a live code performance gently circumvents the 
prevailing ‘body with organs’ paradigm due to its immersion in an operation, the 
consequences of which are not seen on that body. Instead, the coder is rendered one 
element of agency within a projected field of live programing language and a space of 
sound rather than the prime mover of the unfolding aesthetics. And the soundscape 
produced furthers the escape from the judgment of God paradigm by side stepping accepted 
models of musical composition. The sound produced is less about harmony and more about 
producing a type of intensity for both the coder and the audience, hence the devising of the 
algorave events where people can loose themselves to the experience. As eerie as it is 
evocative, the signature of the performance is no longer a singularly human one but that of 
a realm of evolving and interchanging relations between human and non-human. Set up 
through human desire and thus intention but, crucially, allowing a distribution of 
performativity across all elements involved on stage, this approach to performance allows 
an extended carnality that implicates the audience. 
 Figure 1 
 
 
The body proper of live art and the challenge of extended carnality via BwO 
Live art discourse has a longer history than that of live code and understandably the artist’s 
own body has been central to it. At a certain historical point, such a use of the body by an 
artist was a radical breakthrough in the then avant-garde progressive model of art, 
managing to collapse the theory-practice and art-life divides. A key consolidation phase in 
the medium’s historical development was the Body Art movement of the 60’s and 70’s 
where artists employed their body as the site of the performance (many artists preferred the 
word action to remind witnesses that their acts were real acts in the world by real people in 
order to rupture the hegemonic narratives enacted all around them). Often these acts were 
extreme, involving self-mutilation, loaded guns and the endurance of harsh conditions over 
extended periods of time. A mixture of protest, meaningful relationship making and 
provocation of the art world, such actions were often responding to political and social 
inequalities or state level violence being carried out in, for example, Vietnam at the time. A 
key example is Chris Burden’s Shoot action carried out at F Space, California, in 1971. In 
front of a gallery audience, the artist had an assistant shoot him in the arm with a rifle from 
a distance of five meters. Some years later, Burden explained to the People newspaper, "I 
had an intuitive sense that being shot is as American as apple pie. We see people being shot 
on TV, we read about it in the newspaper. Everybody has wondered what it's like. So I did 
it." The imperative nature of the work’s title is telling, questioning how easily people are 
controlled, become passive and desensitized to the suffering of others. There is a social 
commitment in the work through the taking on of an extraordinary individual experience. 
This ethical sensibility of using one’s body and pushing physical endurance to directly take 
on social, political and philosophical issues is still important to many practitioners.  
Without in any way de-valuing such iconic artworks or the changes in public 
consciousness they can facilitate (indeed, this is the type of work I am myself making), it 
could be said, for sake of argument, that they operate within the body with organs 
paradigm. Whilst individual acts of resistance should remain an important muscle of live 
art, contemporary live artists might want to question the classical focal point on the ‘self-
contained’ individual body that they can often unquestioningly celebrate.
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 For all my belief 
in the medium of live art, something has always felt deeply ‘distressing’ when I have 
carried out some of my actions. The problem was not with my intentions, the nature of 
what I was doing, the distaining eye of certain affronted witnesses nor any sense of shame 
on my part, it was just that something was very wrong. To some degree this has hindered 
my public career because I have ended up becoming as suspicious of the medium as I am 
its outspoken advocate. In Deleuze and Guattari’s account of the BwO they explain that just 
as there is a healthy BwO which opposes the organism, there is also an empty BwO of the 
organism that belongs to each of the three strata. It is almost as if live art can fall 
unwittingly prey to servicing an empty BwO of the body strata of the organism. This is not 
a challenge I would level at Burden’s work, which I see as an experiment with matter 
(physical, social and psychic) in line with the practices that Deleuze and Guattari encourage 
and which literally pierces and shatters the body-as-organism transforming it into body-as-
intensity node. This allows for transmittance via the body as opposed to communication via 
the subject, in other words, extended carnality. Extended carnality is to let ‘something else’ 
loose without knowing what it is. As an artist this has always been key but I am now 
considering that my own unconscious habit of performing unwittingly as a body-with-
organs has become an obstacle to the development of my artwork. 
Although I did not discover Deleuze and Guattari’s account of the BwO until 
after the Live Notation’ projected had ended, it was due to the stirrings of the above 
challenging thoughts that I named the collaborative performance with slub (live coding duo 
Alex McLean and Dave Griffiths) at Arnolfini The Hair of the Horse.
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 The title was in part 
due to instinctive poetic sensibility but, following the commonly known ‘hair of the dog’ 
cure for a hangover, it was also to recognize that something like the hair of an animal 
carried as much ‘charged matter’ of the universe and the ‘ability to affect’ as the entire 
organism from which it was plucked. I was starting a cure and as is the case with a magic 
spell, it is the micro perceptible elements that carry the force for change. I focused my 
performance gestures away from my body as a whole and onto my hands, interjecting them 
via live feed into slub’s projected code. I persuaded Alex McLean to replace the computer-
generated sounds played through his live coding with digital recordings of noises made by 
parts of my body (interestingly, once amplified through speakers, there ended up being 
little acoustic difference between the two). In retrospect I realize I was trying to 
symbolically dismember my body in order to allow it to combine with space, airwaves and 
projected computer code. This really gave me a sense that my body being was distributed in 
the space as opposed to my habitual somewhat discomforted sense of  “I am performing.” 
This felt more conducive to my desire to be read as ‘being here’ in a performance as 
opposed to being read as a person; the desire to convey force and not personality.  
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2 
 
Live code and the challenge of critical subjectivity via BwO   
In this final section, I want to suggest what the practice of live art can offer as a 
constructive challenge back to that of live code and, again, I will make reference to Deleuze 
and Guattari’s account of the BwO. What I found hardest in my collaborative performance 
work with live coders was that there was no expectation of developing the raison d’etre for 
doing each of the performances in the first place. By this I do not just mean what the 
performance is about but understanding why it should take place. One could call this a 
more existential dimension of creating work and it seems very specific to live art. There 
was of course discussion about affordances of the venues and any materials we might use to 
garner certain effects. Alex McLean worked on developing his software frameworks for his 
coding which admittedly I wouldn’t have understood nor did I really need to in order to 
collaborate (we agreed from the start that the artist’s body should not become a trigger 
point for the coder’s technological apparatus because this would be too theatrical and 
reductive). But my attempts to open up shared grounds for why we might perform in that 
specific instance failed to take hold. This reflects the different conception-operational 
drives of the two mediums that I mentioned at the start of this piece; one practice is 
improvising through technologically available language, the other through their body 
transfigured as a symbol within a recoding of being human. Returning to the analogy of 
each practice as a type of spatial writing, live art’s use of the symbol - as opposed to live 
code’s use of the logic of language - means that primarily, from my particular perspective 
as a practitioner, live art strives to respond to being human (or posthuman), to existing in a 
world (be it analogue or/and digital) as part of the work’s raison d’etre and unfolding 
process. None of this becomes the literal content of the performance-to-be, its function is to 
cause a mind state from which the form for each performance is created; in other words, 
this is not an aesthetic model of creation. So, I literally cannot perform in public unless I 
have an ethical-artistic reason for doing so.  
This is to speak of live art’s entanglement with ‘critical subjectivity’ where 
subjectivity is understood to be problematic but a vital problematic to creatively engage 
with. The recognition that we have entered the posthuman realm does not mean that 
subjectivity has disappeared or become inoperative. Whilst I am not a defender of the 
classical model, it has to be reckoned with that to disavow subjectivity is still a quasi act of 
subjectivity indicating that critical practices of the self are of the utmost importance if we 
care about agency and world potentiality. The posthuman is ironically and worryingly 
accompanied by the anthropocene, which speaks of a species level sovereignty, giving 
much pause for thought. This type of criticality, informed along Foucauldian lines, is 
nothing but productive and is, “a kind of criticism that would try not to judge but to bring 
an oeuvre, a book, a sentence, an idea to life…it would multiply not judgments but signs of 
existence [emphasis mine]” (Foucault, 1997, cited in Boland, 2007, 127). 
So, the challenge from live art to live coding is to ask in what ways the latter 
practice negotiates critical subjectivity and how this might affect the scope of what can get 
done via it? For all the foregrounded high tech in a live code performance and the relevance 
of papers highlighting the performativity of code in and of its own right,
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 the live coder 
decides for the performance in ways that the keyboard does not and is capable of actions 
like pulling the plug that deprives software, for example, of its agency. The often static, 
half-hidden live coder immersed in his or her lap top is still an embodied subjectivity and 
the ‘prime mover’ for there being an event in first place. For this reason I want to tell you 
how Alex McLean brought a new pair of socks especially for our live coding collaborative 
performance Rock-Space-The House.
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 This appears to be something of a ritual for him 
before a performance and I definitely read his need to perform in un-shoed feet as not 
simply further evidence of just how sensitive the live coder can be to their physical body, 
but that the needs of a subjectivity were present in the room, in the performance. Through 
stockinged feet, the physical world and the consciousness of an individual edged into the 
‘desiring machine,’ that made the multi-directional performance possible, to keep with 
Deleuze and Guattari phraseology, and became central to the flow of that performance. Yet, 
in my experience, there is a sense of habitual subjectivity surrounding the practice as a 
whole and this remains unaffected by the creative work generated and experienced.
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 As is 
often pointed out, human cognition risks entraining by the intelligent machines we use 
more and more frequently and other forces are necessary that counter this; subjectivity is as 
much a type of technology as computer code, it is our earliest experiment with virtual 
reality and also needs improvising with, risking and becoming creatively transformed. 
Interestingly, this part of my exploration can also be made sense of through 
reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s account of the BwO. Employing further violent 
imagery, they warn that there can be cancerous BwOs, constructed purely out of their own 
innate medium and in which case nothing ‘other’ will circulate within or across them. 
Instead, ‘tumors’ develop of their own accord and overtake any possibility of otherness 
thus threatening totalitarian stasis. For example, they state that money has such a type of 
BwO, inflation. To my mind, over-aestheticisation in an art form is such a problematic and 
needs critical subjectivity (ethical questions regarding the relationship between the 
individual and cultural forms of power) in order to be kept in check. Deleuze and Guattari 
may call for the disarticulation of classical subjectivity but they also recognize that 
subjectivity per se cannot be rejected. As element of all three God strata needs to be 
retained as muscle for constructing a BwO: “You have to keep enough of the organism for 
it to reform each dawn; and you have to keep small supplies of significance and 
subjectification, if only to turn them against their own systems when circumstances demand 
it...and you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to 
respond to the dominant reality” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, 160). Critical subjectivity 
implies a critique of the conditions that structured that subjectivity in the first place and 
such conditions will also dominate our forms of art unless confronted. Deleuze and Guattari 
speak of the necessity of mental vigilance, of using a file rather than a sledgehammer to 
disarticulate the three God strata, indeed one must conduct one’s intentionality towards a 
BwO with the “craft of the surveyor” (160). This suggests an ethical prowess, a capacity to 
open oneself up from one’s singular point of existence in order to reach the point of critical 
desire that makes BwO potentiality, that is world-opening potentiality, possible for us in the 
first place. This is the art of being human (or posthuman), not the work of a computer or of 
a body for that matter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3 
 
Excitingly, live coding does recognize that the human in the performance is a 
significant aspect of the work. In an interview with Wired in 2006, Alex McLean affirmed, 
”Live coding places the human right back in the process so you can't really call it 
‘computer-generated’ any more,” and it seems early impulses within the field were about 
putting thought in public and questioning after why we obey rules (Rohrhuber, 2015). So, 
the challenge to live code relates back to the human being before the performance begins, 
as well as how that human creates and interrogates their relationship with cultural forces. 
This is to be vulnerable to what Judith Butler has referred to as a crisis in a subject’s 
epistemic status. She contends that critique as a practice is not something that can be 
voluntarily adopted, it results from ‘subject positions’ that are made ‘unlivable’ and thus 
start to expose the contingencies that made them possible in the first place (Butler, 2002, 
cited in Boland, 2007, 128). To a degree, live artists make work out of this very 
confrontation, for example the ‘liveableness’ of gender expectations or certain notions of 
the role of art can become the impetus for publically shared creative action. What 
constitutes the ‘unlivable’ for the live coder and in what ways could this open up the 
medium’s potential? I ask this because live coding is in an incredibly strong position to 
create new forms of cultural experience which might transform human self-understanding 
in relationship to the phenomenal world as well as inspire the technological imaginary.  
 
Conclusion 
Find your body without organs. Find out how to make it. It’s a question of 
life and death, youth and old age, sadness and joy. It is where everything is 
played out. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p.151) 
 
I have written this extended artist statement out of a commitment to performance as an 
ethical-aesthetic form of being-in-the-world. Overall, there is something ultimately about 
the force of being alive that is at stake here. Feeling that force (a force that is as much 
matter as it is linguistic) is, to use an ironic turn of phrase, not a dead given, there is an art 
to it. For me, this is the larger ‘performance’ that all of our activities secretly aspire to. Nor 
is such a force given to us via our organs such as the heart or kidney which nonetheless 
form our life support structures. Our sense of existence has to be co-created along side all 
that is.  
Critical subjectivity may be the only ‘organ’ we have that can register and be 
affected by existence, by being alive. An artificial organ that has to be de-territorised from 
the body with organs and that is singularly able to sense that the universe is neither 
fundamentally digital nor analogue; critical subjectivity is like a pore in the membrane 
between the knowable and the unknowable. With the liberating realisation that we have 
always been cyborg, our ability to reflect on who we are as singular instances of existence 
caught between the finite and infinite is all the more necessary, otherwise we risk the irony 
of a ‘hegemony of the everything.’ Extended carnality, evoked through certain types of 
performance, allows a consciousness soaked but unrestrained multidimensional touching 
between real and virtual existences, ensuring subjectivity as an evolving creative 
component, not a commander, of an unfurling world. 
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Sheffield 2012 
Photo credit: Pixelwitch 
 
Figure 2 
The Hair of the Horse, Hester Reeve & slub (Alex McLean & Dave Griffiths), Live 
Notation Unit, Arnolfini, 2012 
Photo Credit: Furrows Creative 
 
Figure 3 
Artist working notes: Rock-Space-The House, Hester Reeve, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
1	Funded	by	an	Arts	and	Humanities Research Council Digital Transformations award,	
the	project	involved	six	live	artists,	six	live	coders	and	culminated in a series of 
workshops, talks and performances at Arnolfini, ‘The Live Notation Unit,’ 2012. The 
event and the term ‘live notation’ were explored by Emma Cocker,in Live Code: 
Notations on a Kairotic Practice 2013.in Performance Research. 
2	This is not true of all works produced under the banner of live code or live art, 
inevitably I am looking at the types of work afforded by each discipline that stimulate 
my concerns and ideas. I worked most closely with Alex McLean and I find in his 
thinking and his performances a very pure yet also informed and embodied practice of 
live coding and so I am mainly informed through this association. 	
3	There	are	many	excellent	books	on	this	area.	For	example,	see The Posthuman by 
Rosi Braidotti, 2013, or How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature and Informatics by N. Katherine Hayles, 1999, where she suggests a key 
marker of our posthuman condition is that "there are no essential differences or absolute 
demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation..." (p. 3). 
Posthumanism does not imply an end to being human, it is a rejection of humanist 
principles, in particular that of the essentialist subject, and a recognition that 
human/nonhuman distinctions have become inoperative. 
4	I have been selective in my account of the BwO. It would distract from the main thrust 
of my piece to explain some of the core philosophical ideas and terminology that 
Deleuze and Guattari employ, such as the very important ‘plane of immanence’ (an 
unending horizon of potentiality but one which is neither transcendent of the world nor 
internal to the human being) which is central to many of their accounts. 
5	Some live art works of course go beyond this and others effect extended carnality, I am 
describing a general tendency and only for the sake of progressing some concerns worth 
thinking about here. Stelarc, for example, was already transforming and extending the 
physical body twenty tears ago. I refer less to the technological modifications he carried 
																																																																																																																																																																			
out upon his body –which in one light could be read as continuing the centrality of the 
white privileged western male as the spokes person for human development - but to the 
more effective shift he created when he ceased referring to his flesh as ‘my body’ and 
extended it by speaking of it as ‘the body’ in other words, recognizing it belonged to the 
world and could be of service to and co-joined with human and non-human entities 
alike.	
6	Part of the ‘Live Notation Unit,’ Arnolfini, 2012 
7
 For example, see “Coding Praxis: Reconsidering the aesthetics of code” by Geoff Cox, 
Alex McLean and Adrian Ward in read_me Software Art and Cultures, Aarhus 
University Press, Goriunova, Olga and Shulgin (eds.), Alexei, pp.161-174 
8
 Showroom Cinema, Lovebytes Festival, Sheffield, 2012 
9	I should again point out that I am generalising in order to make my points and speaking 
from my potentially limited experience of live code performances; it could be argued 
that the approach of Click Nilson (Nick Collins) already meets some of the challenges I 
suggest. 
 
 
 
